

CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF CLIMATE JUSTICE AT COP27

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ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini menelaah bagaimana keadilan iklim dikonstruksi secara diskursif dalam pernyataan resmi yang disampaikan pada Konferensi Perubahan Iklim Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa 2022 di Mesir. Penelitian ini bertujuan mengidentifikasi dan membandingkan strategi diskursif yang digunakan oleh perwakilan negara maju, yaitu Uni Eropa, dan negara berkembang, yaitu Pakistan yang mewakili *Group of 77 and China*, serta menganalisis bagaimana fitur linguistik membingkai isu Kerugian dan Kerusakan sebagai persoalan tanggung jawab historis dan kompensasi atau sebagai masalah kapasitas teknis. Menggunakan desain kualitatif deskriptif yang berlandaskan model tiga-dimensi Analisis Wacana Kritis Norman Fairclough, penelitian ini menganalisis data tekstual dari pernyataan publik kedua pihak tersebut dengan prosedur sistematis yang meliputi identifikasi kata kunci, analisis gramatikal dan leksikal, serta interpretasi kontekstual. Temuan menunjukkan adanya divergensi diskursif yang jelas: Pakistan membangun wacana keadilan iklim sebagai tuntutan keadilan reparatif berdasarkan tanggung jawab historis. Sebaliknya, Uni Eropa membingkai isu tersebut sebagai kesenjangan kapasitas, mengutamakan solusi prosedural, dan pengaturan pendanaan yang mendepolitisasi pertanggungjawaban. Keputusan konferensi untuk membentuk dana Kerugian dan Kerusakan merupakan keberhasilan simbolis bagi klaim keadilan, namun mengadopsi pengaturan yang fleksibel dan tidak mengikat sehingga mempertahankan pengaruh aktor negara maju.

Kata kunci: keadilan iklim; Kerugian dan Kerusakan; Analisis Wacana Kritis; keadilan reparatif; kesenjangan kapasitas

ABSTRACT

This study examines how climate justice was discursively constructed in official statements delivered at the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Egypt. It aims to identify and compare the discursive strategies used by a representative developed actor, the European Union, and a developing actor, Pakistan speaking for the Group of 77 and China, and to analyze how linguistic features frame Loss and Damage as either historical responsibility and compensation or as a technical capacity issue. This study adopts a descriptive qualitative design using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) grounded in Norman Fairclough's (2013) three-dimensional model (description, interpretation, explanation) to analyze textual data from the two actors' public statements using a systematic procedure that includes keyword identification, grammatical and lexical analysis, and contextual interpretation. The findings reveal a clear discursive divergence: Pakistan constructs climate justice as a demand for reparative justice based on historical responsibility. In contrast, the European Union frames the issue as a capacity gap, privileging procedural solutions and funding arrangements that depoliticize liability. The conference outcome to establish a Loss and Damage fund constituted a symbolic success for justice claims, but adopted flexible, non-binding arrangements that preserve developed actors' influence.

Keywords: climate justice; Loss and Damage; Critical Discourse Analysis; reparative justice; capacity gap

A. INTRODUCTION

International climate negotiations, governed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Conference of the Parties (COP), are the primary forum for global climate governance. Since the first IPCC report in 1990 established the unprecedented role of human activity in global warming, these negotiations have been characterized by

profound conflicts of interest between nations (Lucas, 2021). The COP is not a neutral decision-making forum but a battleground of competing discourses that shape the outcome of climate agreements (Peralta, 2019). Central to this conflict is the contentious issue of climate justice, which creates a clear rift between developed and developing countries. Developing nations often articulate a discourse of climate justice rooted in the historical responsibilities of industrialized countries, while developed nations advocate for a solidarity narrative focused on present and future emission contributions from all major emitters (Pottier et al., 2017). The 27th COP in Sharm El-Sheikh (COP27) exemplified this ongoing tension, with the establishment of a Loss and Damage Fund as its central, contentious outcome. This issue represents the core of the climate justice debate: vulnerable nations demand compensation for irreversible climate impacts, invoking principles of reparative justice, while developed countries resist formal liability, framing their contributions as voluntary (Åberg & Jeffs, 2022).

Previous research has effectively utilized Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to deconstruct power and ideology in climate politics. For instance, Susan (2021) applied CDA to analyze climate justice discourses from various actors at COP26, revealing how power inequalities led to the exclusion of certain justice concepts from the final Glasgow Pact. In a different context, Leung (2020) employed Fairclough's CDA model to examine how activist Greta Thunberg strategically blends dominant and counter-discourses in her rhetoric for climate justice. While these studies demonstrate the utility of CDA, a distinct gap remains. Susan's analysis encompassed a broad range of actors, and Leung's focused on an individual activist, leaving a need for a focused analysis of the official, state-level discourse that constitutes the core of COP negotiations. This study addresses this gap by applying Norman Fairclough's model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine the discursive construction of climate justice in the official public statements delivered at the COP27 High-Level Segment.

This study examines the divergent discursive constructions of climate justice presented by developed and developing countries. This divergence contributes to the persistent deadlock in international climate negotiations, as exemplified by the contentious establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27. To examine how this deadlock is produced and sustained discursively, the study compares the linguistic and rhetorical strategies employed in official COP27 statements by a representative developed actor, the European Union, and a representative developing country, Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the G77/China. Drawing on Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis framework, the analysis focuses on evaluative lexical choices, nominalization, and patterns of agency (active and passive voice) to reveal how climate justice is framed either as a matter of historical responsibility and compensatory obligation or as a technical challenge requiring collaborative and procedural solutions.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) conceptualizes discourse as a form of social practice through which power relations and ideological positions are produced, legitimized, and contested (Fairclough, 2013). Rather than treating language as neutral, CDA examines how particular representations become normalized and accepted as common sense, thereby sustaining hegemonic social relations (Gramsci, 1971; Van Leeuwen, 2008). In the context of international climate negotiations, official COP statements constitute an institutionalized

discursive space in which states articulate competing interpretations of responsibility, justice, and obligation under conditions of unequal power.

This study adopts Fairclough's three-dimensional model of CDA, focusing on the interaction between textual features, discursive practice, and broader social structures. At the textual level, the analysis examines how specific linguistic choices in COP27 statements construct climate justice and Loss and Damage. Nominalization is analyzed to identify how processes such as responsibility, loss, or compensation are reified as abstract entities (e.g., "funding arrangements," "capacity gaps"), potentially obscuring agency and accountability. Modality is examined to assess how degrees of obligation, necessity, and possibility (e.g., "must," "need to," "can") regulate commitment and urgency in climate action. Transitivity patterns, including the use of active and passive voice, are analyzed to reveal how actors are foregrounded or backgrounded, thereby assigning or deflecting responsibility for climate impacts.

At the level of discursive practice, these textual choices are interpreted in relation to the institutional conventions of COP negotiations, where diplomatic language, consensus-building norms, and strategic ambiguity shape what can be explicitly claimed or avoided. Official statements are thus understood not merely as individual expressions, but as products of institutionalized negotiation practices that constrain and enable particular discourses of climate justice.

At the level of social practice, the analysis situates these discursive patterns within broader structures of global political economy and North–South power asymmetries. Discourses that frame Loss and Damage as a technical or capacity-based issue are interpreted as reproducing existing governance arrangements dominated by developed states, while discourses emphasizing historical responsibility and compensation are read as challenges to these hegemonic structures. Through this multi-level analysis, CDA enables the study to demonstrate how linguistic choices in COP27 statements both reflect and reproduce the unequal power relations that shape international climate governance.

2. Gramsci on Hegemony

The term *hegemony* originates from the Ancient Greek *hēgemonía*, meaning leadership or dominance. In classical Greek usage, it referred to the political and military leadership exercised by a powerful state over allied polities, typically maintained through superior influence and force and vulnerable to collapse following military defeat (Wilkinson, 2008). Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to explain the complex mechanisms by which power is maintained and contested, not only through coercion (militaristic force) but also through consent (intellectual and moral leadership). A ruling class can lead politically when it succeeds in convincing people that its values or interests are the interests of everyone. This is where the role of the group's organic intellectuals comes in: they reformulate their group's ideology into a universal ideology and continuously disseminate it through discursive practices and everyday social practices (Mouffe, 2014). Society is the arena where the process of creating hegemony occurs.

Gramsci divides society into two spheres that indicate two modes of power: civil society (schools, religious institutions, community organizations, mass media and so forth), which is the realm of consensus creation; and political society (government, the police, the state apparatus), which is the arena of the state and formal apparatus that use rules and coercion

(Dikici-Bilgin, 2009). Consensus is created primarily through the production of discourse, where terms used to represent reality are determined and framed as reasonable by the ruling class. When people agree that those ideologically loaded terms are universal facts, the ideology becomes part of society's "common sense", and that hegemony of power is realized. "Common sense" is the ideology that has become a universal idea and is regarded as not needing to be questioned. It can be found in various everyday social practices, for example, in the family, school, social media, culture, rituals, and so on.

3. Climate Justice

Climate justice emerged in response to the unequal distribution of responsibility for, and vulnerability to, climate change, framing it as a moral and social justice issue concerned with responsibility, harm, and equitable solutions (Klinsky et al., 2014). Originating in environmental activism and human rights movements demanding accountability from industrialized countries as major historical emitters (Newell et al., 2021), the concept has become a central normative framework in international climate negotiations. In academic and policy discourse, climate justice informs critiques of climate policies that neglect moral considerations and underpins key principles invoked by states in UNFCCC negotiations, including compensatory justice for past harms, distributive justice in allocating responsibilities, procedural justice in decision-making, and intergenerational justice (Pottier et al., 2017). These principles are institutionalized and contested within the UNFCCC regime. The IPCC synthesizes justice-relevant criteria (responsibility, capacity, the right to development, and equality) that shape negotiation positions and policy outcomes (Fleurbaey et al., 2014). Most notably, the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) structured differentiated obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, generated enduring North–South tensions across successive COPs, and was later rearticulated in the Paris Agreement through the more flexible framework of Nationally Determined Contributions (Pauw et al., 2019). Consequently, climate justice functions not merely as a moral ideal but as a core discursive and institutional logic through which international climate negotiations are conducted and contested.

C. METHOD

This study adopts a descriptive qualitative design using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) grounded in Norman Fairclough's (2013) three-dimensional model (description, interpretation, explanation) to investigate how the concept of climate justice is discursively constructed within official statements at COP27. The chosen design is appropriate because CDA explicitly links linguistic choices to wider social and political contexts, enabling the researcher to analyze how language reproduces, challenges, or reshapes power relations within international climate negotiations. The data used in this research is textual data related to climate justice, which includes sentences, phrases, and keywords from official statements. The data sources of the research were the official public statements delivered by the European Union and Pakistan at the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference (COP27), collected from the European Commission and the Pakistani Ministry of Climate Change website.

For this research, the data collection technique involved a close reading of the texts to identify, categorize, and select relevant excerpts. After collecting the data, the researcher analyzed it to uncover the underlying ideologies and power relations. The analysis followed a seven-step procedure informed by Critical Discourse Analysis. First, the COP27 statements were

read closely and repeatedly to identify dominant themes and institutional contexts, particularly references to climate justice and Loss and Damage. Second, salient keywords and phrases were identified, focusing on evaluative lexis, metaphors, modal expressions, and formulations related to responsibility and capacity. Third, the data were organized according to underlying ideological values, such as historical responsibility, solidarity, justice, and accountability. Fourth, key linguistic features, including lexical choice, nominalization, modality, transitivity, and active or passive voice, were analyzed to examine how agency, obligation, and causality were constructed. Fifth, relations between participants were examined through pronoun use and evaluative positioning to reveal patterns of authority, dependence, and cooperation. Sixth, participant identities were analyzed to determine how actors were discursively constructed (e.g., as vulnerable victims or capable leaders). Finally, the findings were synthesized and reported in relation to the research questions and broader socio-political context of international climate negotiations.

D. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the findings and discussion of a critical discourse analysis of climate change at COP27. It explored and displayed national responsibility and accountability, loss and damage, and finance through statements made by various nations at the COP27 event.

1. Findings

a. Responsibility and Accountability

Fairclough (2013) notes that lexical choices construct ideological realities. The following quotations of Pakistan's statement address the theme of climate responsibility:

"It is also the forum where we as vulnerable countries take our case to the rich and the resourced, to build common purpose for justice, carbon neutrality, and a roadmap to crucial policy resets needed in a world that is burning up faster than our capacities for recovery." (Pakistani Delegation para. 5)
"The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment estimates \$30 bn in L&D." (Pakistani Delegation para. 8)
"Our low-carbon footprint of less than one % did not contribute to this." (Pakistani Delegation para. 10)

Pakistan's COP27 rhetoric, which uses terms like "vulnerable," "the rich and the resourced," and the inclusive "we", frames responsibility as historically differentiated and casts COP27 as a moral forum for claims to "justice" and "recovery". Pakistan's factual claim of a "low-carbon footprint of less than one %" and the negation "did not contribute" function rhetorically to redirect culpability toward larger emitters and to legitimize calls for compensation and support. Meanwhile, the EU statement emphasizes a burden-sharing narrative, as shown in the following quotations:

"Because too many countries cannot shoulder the climate crisis on their own." (Timmermans para. 15)
"But we need to trust each other, launch a well-designed process so that we can end with the best possible result, with the highest benefits and the most value to those that need it most." (Timmermans para. 17)

The EU frames responsibility as a shared burden and collective solidarity: phrases such as “cannot shoulder the climate crisis on their own” and calls to “trust each other” and build a “well-designed process” emphasize capacity gaps while privileging procedural solutions. The EU’s modal language, such as “need to” and “can”, lowers immediacy and conditions action on consensus and process, thereby depoliticizing historical accountability in favor of negotiated, process-bound outcomes.

Discursively, Pakistan’s justice-centered discourse challenged existing power structures, while the EU’s process-oriented narrative aimed to maintain its influential role in climate governance by setting the terms of the response.

b. Loss and Damage: Systemic Injustice versus Capacity Gap

Loss and Damage (L&D) is a central issue in the COP27 negotiations and a key site where competing discourses of climate justice are articulated. In COP27 statements, L&D is discursively constructed either as a manifestation of systemic injustice requiring compensation or as a capacity gap requiring technical intervention. The statements from Pakistan and the EU present this issue from different perspectives; the dataset consists of quotations that address Loss and Damage.

“Second, L&D needs to be part of the core agenda of COP27 to meet the pressing humanitarian needs of those that are trapped in a crisis of public financing fueled by debt and yet have to fund climate-disasters on their own.” (Pakistani Delegation para. 13)

Pakistan frames L&D as structural injustice through lexical choices such as “trapped in a crisis” and “fueled by debt,” which interdiscursively draw on humanitarian and political-economic discourses. Passive constructions and metaphors suppress agency and foreground victimhood, revealing inequality while partially naturalizing injustice by leaving perpetrators unnamed. Conversely, the EU’s discourse frames Loss and Damage as an issue of capacity gaps, as shown in the following quotations:

“We are ready to address loss and damage.” (Timmermans para. 15)

“Because too many countries cannot shoulder the climate crisis on their own.” (Timmermans para. 15)

The EU frames L&D as a capacity gap. The exclusive pronoun “we” refers to the EU and its member states, thereby positioning the EU as an active subject with capacity. This casts Loss and Damage and the affected countries as passive recipients to be managed by the EU. Quotation (2) explicitly acknowledges capacity disparities among actors in global climate governance: the negation “cannot” emphasizes certain countries’ inability to cope with climate impacts, and the metaphor “shoulder” frames those impacts as a burden to be carried. The phrase “on their own” further reinforces the need for external intervention and functions as an appeal to better-resourced states to provide support. Together, these lexical and grammatical choices construct an image of the EU as a capable leader offering assistance, diverting attention from historical responsibility and focusing on technical support rather than systemic change. This discourse foregrounds technical assistance and dependency, depoliticizing structural causation by treating injustice as a gap in resources and capability.

Pakistan constructs L&D as moral and structural injustice, mobilizing solidarity and claims for compensation. Vulnerable states are positioned as victims of the global financial system, yet Pakistan does not explicitly name the actors or processes that produce this injustice. This rhetorical choice, therefore, both reveals and conceals global power relations. Meanwhile, the EU frames it as a solvable capacity deficit, legitimizing procedural and assistance-based responses while avoiding direct responsibility for systemic causes. Through this capacity-disparity narrative, the EU produces relations of dependency and divides states into relatively capable and less-capable actors, thereby legitimizing international assistance mechanisms.

c. Finance: Concrete Demand versus Technical Assistance

In Pakistan's discourse, the figure "*US\$30 bn*" materializes Loss and Damage as a concrete financial claim rather than an abstract appeal. Quantification functions ideologically to translate moral injustice into an economic obligation, aligning humanitarian discourse with political-economic accountability:

"The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment estimates \$30 bn in L&D." (Pakistani Delegation para. 8)

"Second, L&D needs to be part of the core agenda of COP27 to meet the pressing humanitarian needs of those that are trapped in a crisis of public financing fueled by debt and yet have to fund climate-disasters on their own." (Pakistani Delegation para. 13)

By coupling this figure with references to debt, fiscal crisis, and humanitarian need, Pakistan constructs L&D as reparative finance grounded in structural inequality rather than discretionary aid. The modal formulation "*needs to be part of the core agenda*" presents inclusion as a necessity rather than a negotiable preference, limiting discursive alternatives and foregrounding urgency while leaving responsible actors implicit. In contrast, the EU's discourse reframes L&D through procedural and managerial logics:

"Because too many countries cannot shoulder the climate crisis on their own." (Timmermans para. 15)

"The EU is committed to taking concrete measures to address the gap in Loss and Damage, including new funding arrangements." (Timmermans para. 17)

"But we need to trust each other, launch a well-designed process so that we can end with the best possible result, with the highest benefits and the most value to those that need it most." (Timmermans para. 17)

The EU frames L&D as a capacity shortfall to be managed through technical, procedural measures: commitments to "address" the gap, "concrete measures," and "funding arrangements" emphasize solidarity, process, and efficiency while avoiding explicit reparations. Phrases like "cannot shoulder... on their own" and appeals to "trust" and a "well-designed process" legitimize negotiated, conditional assistance and obscure who will pay and how.

The outcome at COP27, a new fund with plural "arrangements" for Loss and Damage, reflects a negotiated compromise between these two positions: a historic win for developing countries that still requires future struggle to secure concrete financing. The formal recognition of L&D and new funding arrangements is historic, but the shift from moral claim to procedural mechanisms leaves the fight for concrete, adequate financing unresolved.

2. Discussion

From the identification of the above linguistic features, a clear divergence emerges regarding concepts of justice in addressing the climate crisis. Pakistan's discourse deploys morally charged lexis and factual claims to construct a narrative of historical injustice and to demand reparative justice. Evaluative vocabulary, metaphors, and grammatical choices depict vulnerability, powerlessness, historical injustice, and systemic inequality, reflecting Pakistan's and other vulnerable countries' experiences as victims who suffer losses and damages from the climate crisis without sufficient resources to cope. In previous COP negotiations, Loss and Damage has frequently been raised by vulnerable and developing countries but was often sidelined as part of adaptation and mitigation agendas (McNamara et al., 2018). As a representative of the G-77/China group, Pakistan's discursive strategy aims to apply pressure at COP27 to secure Loss and Damage as a priority agenda item rather than to subsume it under adaptation. Its discourse not only highlights systemic injustices in climate negotiations but also connects these injustices to broader, historically embedded inequalities in the global economic structure. By constructing a narrative of victimhood and systemic injustice, Pakistan seeks to build solidarity with other developing countries and to claim compensatory responsibility from wealthy states.

Meanwhile, the European Union's discourse emphasizes technocratic, procedural solutions for addressing Loss and Damage (L&D). In previous COP negotiations, the EU and several other developed states rejected G-77/China proposals for specific L&D funding on the grounds that further discussion was needed about who should pay (Vanhala et al., 2021). As a representative of a bloc of developed states, the EU seeks to ensure that climate negotiations produce outcomes that protect its members' interests while preserving diplomatic relations. The EU's discursive strategy frames L&D as a problem of capacity gaps that requires procedural remedies. Although this stance explicitly acknowledges capacity shortfalls, it avoids naming the structural roots of those inequalities. The deployment of technical and diplomatic terminology shifts demands for financial compensation toward policy-oriented funding mechanisms.

Through this strategy, the EU cultivates an image of itself as a climate leader and constructs a reality in which L&D solutions are conceived as contributions or assistance from developed states rather than reparations grounded in justice. In doing so, the EU's discursive practice seeks to maintain climate-governance structures dominated by developed states.

Critical discourse analysis reveals that these differences are not merely semantic but constitute a contestation over the meaning of justice. Pakistan seeks to define justice in terms of reparations and accountability, whereas the European Union promotes an understanding of justice as collaboration and technical assistance. The outcome of COP27 (the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan), which established agreement on an L&D fund with multiple "funding arrangements", manifests this discursive struggle: a symbolic victory for Pakistan, albeit one whose technical details permit the EU to retain significant influence.

These findings align with Susan (2021), who argues that "the Glasgow Pact is written in favor of developed countries" and that "developed parties have the upper hand in negotiations." Susan also observes that discourse invoking historical responsibility is largely absent from COP27 policy outputs, echoing her finding of a "mismatch between what countries are saying and what is actually enacted." This absence reflects the power of developed actors to shape policy texts.

The analysis identifies the EU's deployment of technical and procedural vocabulary (e.g., "funding arrangements," "well-designed process"), which attenuates moral claims and redirects

attention away from compensation. Similarly, Susan (2021) found the use of “feeble language like ‘acknowledging’, ‘noting’ and ‘emphasizing’” in the Glasgow Pact—formulations that are non-binding and offer limited incentive for developed countries to fulfill their commitments. Thus, this study both confirms and refines previous research. It corroborates the hegemony of developed countries, the gap between discourse and action, and the prevalence of non-binding language. By focusing on two key actors and conducting a detailed linguistic analysis, the study clarifies the discursive mechanisms that produce and sustain this hegemony and the discourse–action gap. Thus, this study both confirms and refines previous research. It corroborates existing findings on the discursive hegemony of developed countries, the persistent gap between moral claims and policy outcomes, and the prevalence of non-binding, procedural language in COP agreements. At the same time, it extends the literature by moving beyond broad textual analysis of COP outcomes to a comparative, actor-centered CDA of negotiation discourse. By examining how Pakistan and the EU linguistically construct Loss and Damage during COP27, this study specifies the micro-discursive mechanisms in which justice claims are either politicized or neutralized.

E. CONCLUSION

This study sets out to investigate the divergent discursive constructions of climate justice between developed and developing countries, a central deadlock in international climate negotiations, as exemplified by the contentious establishment of the Loss and Damage (L&D) fund at COP27. Guided by the objectives of identifying and comparing the discursive strategies of Pakistan (representing the G77/China) and the European Union (EU), and analyzing how these features frame climate justice, the analysis reveals a fundamental discursive contest.

The findings confirm a clear and strategic divergence in discursive framing. Pakistan’s rhetoric constructs climate justice as a matter of historical responsibility and reparative justice. The discursive strategy positions vulnerable nations as victims of an unequal global order and explicitly redirects culpability toward historical emitters, demanding compensation as an obligatory form of accountability. Conversely, the EU’s discourse frames climate justice as a challenge of capacity and collaboration. The discursive strategy depoliticizes the issue, shifting the focus from historical liability and compensation to technical assistance and negotiated, conditional support, thereby legitimizing the EU’s role as a climate leader while protecting its members from formal liability.

The COP27’s establishment of a Loss and Damage fund marked a symbolic victory for Pakistan’s justice narrative. However, the EU’s discursive influence ensured the agreement adopted non-binding, flexible arrangements which diluted demands for reparations and left liability mechanisms open to future contestation. This aligns with the broader power dynamics noted in the introduction, which developed countries, despite rhetorical concessions, ultimately shape policy outputs to resist binding commitments. Moreover, the outcome encapsulates the tension between transformative justice and technocratic preservation in climate politics, underscoring how language shapes power, responsibility, and systemic change (Fairclough, 2013).

After examining the representation of climate justice in statements from the EU and Pakistan at COP27, future research could extend this study by examining climate justice discourses articulated by Small Island Developing States, Indigenous groups, and climate

activists at COP27. Using alternative linguistic frameworks such as appraisal theory or corpus-assisted discourse analysis would help capture marginalized perspectives that are often absent from state-centered negotiations and deepen understanding of how climate justice is constructed across diverse actors.

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